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There has been a resurgence of interest, in the past few years and across many disciplinary 
areas, in the interactions between truth, sincerity, and politics. While it is, of course, possible to 
argue that this has been a pervasive discourse for some time, even going back to Trilling's 
Sincerity and Authenticity and beyond, the marked rise of so-called post-ironic fiction, 
embodied in the works of David Foster Wallace, has triggered some interest in the field of 
English Literature. Likewise, in the area of Classics, Elizabeth Markovitz's 2008 book, The 
Politics of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech, and Democratic Judgment has extended this aspect back 
into contemporary politics via a focus on the ancients. 
 It is amid this context that, naturally, one would expect to see new work arising that 
considers Foucault's notion of parrhesia; truth-telling and its enmeshment amid systems of 
power. Many of the studies that contribute to this renewed interest in truth and sincerity, after 
all, make passing references to this aspect of Foucault's thought. How could they not? To-date, 
though, no other study has so intensely juxtaposed political theory with the aspects of 
parrhesia in the lectures that Foucault gave at the University of California at Berkeley. In a 
mid-form Palgrave Pivot volume, Torben Bech Dyrberg works to remedy this situation and 
produces a fresh approach to understanding the interaction between parrhesia and politics. 
Although frequently insightful, and certainly clear in its liberal use of diagrams throughout, 
readers should be forewarned that Foucault on the Politics of Parrhesia yields a very specific 
disciplinary take on the matter, and that the Foucault that emerges is more of a political 
philosopher of the present than a philosopher-historian. 
 Indeed, arguing for a Foucauldian identity that has taken a “political turn” (24), the 
core line that Dyrberg promotes is that “parrhesia is vital for Foucault’s sustained efforts over 
the years to expose and criticize the various forms of obedience [...] which go hand in hand 
with elite rule, hierarchical structures and states of domination”, an aspect that he places at the 
very “centre of Foucault’s many histories” (3). This perspectivized view is, of course, not a 
new strategy. Foucault's discourse was itself one that perpetually and retroactively inscribed 
his later work at the heart of its antecedents, an aspect that has contributed to his broad uptake 
in many areas. One of his favourite phrases was the claim that he had “always been interested 
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in” this or that problem.1 
 Dyrberg's effort to politicise Foucault's parrhesia is split across an introduction and 
seven chapters, covering productive power; political (rather than epistemic) critique; political 
concepts of freedom and law; the relationship of parrhesia to politics; the place of parrhesia in 
democracy; the leader/community divide; and the role of authority. The argument throughout 
the book is patient and works from first principles. This has the advantage that, when Dyrberg 
comes to his new material on parrhesia, it is solidly grounded. Concurrently, though, this 
creates the problem that, while Foucault on the Politics of Parrhesia is not a text for beginners 
(dealing as it does with complex syntheses of remarks over Foucault's entire career), some of 
the areas covered are familiar and overly remarked upon in the extant literature. For instance, 
while Dyrberg is articulate and adeptly re-formulates Foucault's concepts of power in chapter 
two, the idea of a Foucauldian productive power that is constituted by the effects of practices 
is well known and re-iterated throughout the text (13, passim). 
 Likewise, a specifically weighted genealogy of Foucault's notion of critique is posited. 
Here, Kant is not, for the most part, the primal figure against whose work Foucault's historical, 
instead of epistemological, critique is set. Rather, for Dyrberg, Foucault's critique is 
counterposed against the liberal bourgeois “System” and Marxism, and defined as “political” 
instead of “historical” (44). Although Dyrberg cites the famous proposition that a critical 
ontology of the self is a “a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond” (34-35), 
it is the political side of Foucault's project that Dyrberg brings to the fore. 
 When, however, Dyrberg turns to the object of his book's title, a little over halfway 
through the work, the specific view of parrhesia under discussion is finally explained. For 
Dyrberg, parrhesia is “a political concept, which is intertwined with the attitudes and 
decisions of individuals based on an assessment of their trustworthiness as well as their 
boldness and courage when it comes to deciding and acting”. It is also, in Dyrberg's reading, 
“related to government in general and democratic government in particular” (67), an assertion 
that is extrapolated from The Government of Self and Others, Lectures at the Collège de France 
1982–1983. The particular angle that Dyrberg adopts here is useful as it allows him to open up 
comparative readings to Rawls and Arendt in chapter six; an aspect that should prove fruitful 
for those working in the political disciplines who might wish to follow on from this thinking. 
 Overall, though, there are to my mind some core problems that remain in this work. 
Firstly, there was a degree of a-historicity in the reading that does disservice to otherwise 
persuasive arguments. Only two pages give any substantial attention to the fact that Foucault's 
analysis is drawn from a particular focus on antiquity, while the remainder of the book treats 
parrhesia as an a-temporal phenomenon with clear applications to contemporary governance 
from “Plato onwards” (99-100, 103). This might be considered as shaky ground. After all, Todd 
May concurs with Deleuze that Foucault never intended his epistemes to stand in historical 
perpetuity or for his analyses to be treated as universal.2 That said, one could take Luxon's 
                                                          
1 See Lynne Huffer, “Foucault’s Eros,” in Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki (eds.), A 
Companion to Foucault (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2013), 445. Available online at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/doi/10.1002/9781118324905.ch22/summary. 
2 Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault (Chesham: Acumen, 2006), 134; Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control,” October, vol. 59 (Winter 1992), 3. 
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suggestion that “Foucault turns to the ancients to overcome a blind spot in contemporary 
practices”.3 This, though, is not broached in Dyrberg's work. 
 Secondly, I was also struck, to some degree, by the literature in this volume that went 
uncited. Although, naturally, it is not mandatory to cite all preceding work when taking a 
particular stance, it was surprising, for instance, to see no references in this book to Judith 
Butler, Alison Ross, Zacharia Simpson or Nancy Luxon, all of whom have written on this 
aspect of Foucault's late thought.4 “How come”, the author asks, “there are so few who have 
studied Foucault’s lectures on parrhesia” (69)? How come, one might retort, those who have 
are not featured here?  
 Overall, Dyrberg's book will prove valuable to those in political disciplines looking to 
begin work on Foucault's concept of parrhesia and its implications for contemporary 
democracy. Foremost among its articulations are an often clear approach to complex topics 
and a serious attempt to integrate late-Foucault's work into contemporary thought on politics. 
If I were to wholeheartedly agree with everything in Dyrberg's book, though, I would not, 
myself, be speaking truthfully. 
 
Martin Paul Eve 
 Birkbeck, University of London 
                                                          
3 Nancy Luxon, Crisis of Authority: Politics, Trust, and Truth-Telling in Freud and Foucault (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 150. 
4 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Alison Ross, “Why 
Is ‘Speaking the Truth’ Fearless? ‘Danger’ and ‘Truth’ in Foucault’s Discussion of Parrhesia,” Parrhesia, no. 4 
(2008), 62–75; Zacharia Simpson, “The Truths We Tell Ourselves: Foucault on Parrhesia,” Foucault Studies, 
no. 13 (26 March 2012), 99–115; Nancy Luxon, “Truthfulness, Risk, and Trust in the Late Lectures of Michel 
Foucault,” Inquiry vol. 47, no. 5 (1 October 2004), 464–89. 
